Abstract-"Fusion for Energy" (F4E) is designing, developing, and implementing the European helium-cooled lead-lithium (HCLL) and helium-cooled pebble-bed test blanket systems (TBSs) for ITER (Nuclear Facility INB-174). Safety demonstration is an essential element for the integration of these TBSs into ITER and accident analysis is one of its critical components. A systematic approach to accident analysis has been developed under the F4E contract on TBS safety analyses. F4E technical requirements, together with Amec Foster Wheeler and Idaho National Laboratory efforts, have resulted in a comprehensive methodology for fusion breeding blanket accident analysis that addresses the specificity of the breeding blanket designs, materials, and phenomena while remaining consistent with the approach already applied to the ITER accident analyses. The methodology phases are illustrated in this paper by its application to the EU HCLL TBS using both MELCOR and RELAP5 codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE first substantial analyses of the safety characteristics of fusion reactors appeared in the period 1969-1970 although it took a decade before the more sophisticated analytical models (including computer simulations) of accident conditions emerged [1] . The first safety study of a fusion power plant (FPP) dates back to the mid-1990s [2] , [3] . Following the definition of magnetic fusion facility safety requirements [4] and issue of the safety guidelines [5] and handbook [6] by the U.S. Department of Energy in 1996, many fusion safety studies including accident analyses were performed. To characterize and quantify the safety and environmental aspects of FPPs, studies using the tokamak concept have been undertaken within the European Fusion Program under the names SEAFP and SEAL [7] - [14] . In parallel to these programs, safety analysis has been performed for the detailed engineering design of ITER by the USA, Japan, and the EU [15] - [22] . With the signature of the ITER agreement in 2006, safety studies were focused on licensing ITER in France [23] - [26] . An overview of the 1990-2012 European safety studies, current activities, and those planned up to 2018 is available in [27] . Fusion safety activities in recent years might be considered in two main streams-work on ITER licensing and further safety studies of the accelerated programs on demonstration FPP-DEMO. The former also includes the safety demonstration of the test blanket system (TBS) in ITER. Among the safety studies on DEMO, it is worth noting the European safety approach and selection of critical event sequences that is currently under development in the EUROfusion program [28] - [30] ; the US ARIES-ACT1 safety analysis of multiple coolants and coolant loop designs [31] , [32] ; the proposed confinement strategies, systematic accident scenario analyses, and source term assessment performed for the Japanese water-cooled DEMO [33] - [35] ; application of the GenIV-integrated safety assessment methodology [36] to the Korean DEMO [37] - [39] ; and the fusion safety research regulatory, reliability, and experimental activities being performed in China [40] .
Testing the tritium breeder modules (TBMs) in ITER [41] and the need to include them in the ITER licensing [42] offers a unique opportunity for further development and validation of the methodology for breeder blanket (BB) accident analysis [43] - [49] . With the progress of ITER construction, the attention to safety and accident analyses of TBS is increasing [50] - [53] . The safety approach and accident analysis methodology for ITER is very well defined, as demonstrated by the successful construction licensing [28] - [30] , [54] . However, due to the later inclusion of the TBM testing program in the ITER agreement, the TBS safety demonstration was somewhat detached from the ITER machine safety at the beginning of the project.
Safety studies for fusion facilities are commonly conducted using codes originally developed for the fission reactor accident analysis. Some of these codes have been modified, and have additional physical models to treat fusionrelevant phenomena [55] - [63] . For example, fusion-adapted versions of MELCOR are widely applied for fusion accident analyses [32] , [43] , [64] - [70] . The fusion-modified U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright. codes are validated against the limited available fusion experimental data or through benchmarking against validated code(s) or code version(s) [71] - [79] . Note that the experimental data for many BB (accident) phenomena are not yet available. In contrast, the underlying fission safety codes have undergone development and validation using extensive separate and integral effects experimental databases [80] - [83] . These huge international efforts (including the 2-D/3-D program [80] and many computational benchmark problems) using phenomena identification and ranking tables (PIRTs) [84] and improved simulation models have led to the development of a best estimate methodology for fission safety. At present, we are not aware of any PIRT application to fusion safety and accident analyses although we note the systematic approach followed by the Korean DEMO project [38] , [39] that foresees the application of five analytical tools to develop the safety requirements: qualitative safety features review, PIRT, objective provision trees, probabilistic safety assessment, and deterministic and phenomenological analysis [38] .
This paper is devoted to establishing a systematic integrated ITER-TBS/DEMO-BB accident analysis methodology for simulating the fault response of the TBM/breeding blanket and its interaction with the rest of the machine/plant. The methodology consists of several phases: 1) deterministic selection of accident scenarios supported by failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA); 2) elaboration on these to develop accident analysis specifications (AASs) via the use of PIRT to identify the required physical models to aid in code selection; 3) development of TBS models using the selected analysis codes; and 4) qualification of the models via comparison with finite-element analysis (FEA), code-to-code comparisons, and sensitivity studies.
The outlined methodology addresses the challenge in performing accident analysis for the EU TBS in an environment lacking experimental data on TBS phenomena. According to the French INB order 2012 [85] , some TBS subsystems and components are protection important components and the application of the methodology provided in this paper to the ITER TBS accident analyses is a protection important activity. For this reason, compliance with the French INB order was a fundamental requirement for this paper described hereafter.
II. SELECTION OF REFERENCE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
As described in [47] and [49] , the procedure developed for the selection of reference accident scenarios for ITER [86] , [87] has been used to identify scenarios for the EU TBS. The accidental conditions, or postulated initiating events, which might give rise to a release of radioactivity, were determined from an FMEA evaluation [45] ; a set of reference accidents was then identified, by grouping individual accident initiators that have similar consequences, as outlined in [49] .
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SPECIFICATIONS
In the presented methodology, the reference scenarios are elaborated on to provide an AAS for each scenario, which are as follows.
1) Defines the analysis approach for each scenario. 2) States the purpose of each scenario (including the definition of the analysis objectives, acceptance criteria, and expected outputs). 3) Defines the initiating event for each accident and identifies the expected accident sequence. 4) Identifies system operation assumptions (system availability/data) and the scope of the required analysis. The AASs are used, together with phenomena identification tables, to identify the requirements to be met by the analysis codes and TBS/BB models. In this manner, the limitations of individual analysis codes may be identified, and, where necessary, modeling approaches to overcome these limitations can be proposed prior to the model development.
The full definition of the AAS for each scenario is performed in four steps.
1) Draft a preliminary AAS for the scenario.
2) Identify the phenomena that are likely to occur and list the required code models. 3) Select the most suitable code and code version for analysis according to the predefined criteria; specify how deficiencies or gaps in the available code models will be handled. 4) Update the AAS and provide a flowchart describing the accident progression. These steps are described in Sections III-A-III-D.
A. Preliminary Accident Analysis Specification
A preliminary AAS is developed to provide sufficient information about the purpose of each scenario (analysis objectives, acceptance criteria, and expected outputs) and the expected accident sequence to support the phenomena identification and code assessment/selection activities.
For the helium-cooled lead-lithium (HCLL) TBS, the preliminary safety report (and FMEA study) was used as starting points for the definition of the analysis objectives, initiating events and aggravating failures. As an example, for the HCLL TBS, the objectives identified for the long-term loss of off-site power (LOOP 32 h) 1 scenario are as follows.
1) To investigate the response of the TBS to the LOOP. 2) To analyze the thermal-hydraulic transients in the TBS.
3) To confirm that thermal transients do not cause damage to confinement barriers. 4) To confirm that postaccident cooling is established to remove decay heat. 5) To confirm that radioactive and energy inventories can be kept under control. 6) To confirm that radioactive releases are within limits. The acceptance criteria for each scenario are then selected based on the objectives defined. Specific safety design requirements given in system requirement documents are used 1 In the reference 32 h LOOP scenario, the plasma shutdown at time 0 s causes a disruption with no damage of the first wall (FW) of the shielding blanket or breeder modules. Thus, there are no cooling pipe or BU breaks foreseen in the scenario. The major disruption with damage to the FW that causes the cooling pipe and BU breaks is considered as an aggravating failure and is the subject of another reference scenario, i.e., 32 h LOOP accident with major disruption as aggravating failure.
as the basis for acceptance criteria where available. The main criteria identified for HCLL TBS include the following. 1) TBM decay heat removal shall be achieved by thermal radiation/conduction without exceeding the temperature safety limit of structures in the case of loss of active TBM cooling. 2) A 2.5 kg limit for additional hydrogen production per TBM shall not be exceeded. This implies that the amount of PbLi available in the VV for reaction with water shall be limited to 0.28 m 3 . 3) Potential helium spills in to the VV shall be limited to ensure the functioning of the VV pressure suppression system-the current assessed limit is 45 kg of helium. Based on the system design data and existing safety files, the scope of the accident analysis (i.e., the range of systems involved) and the expected accident sequence is outlined within the preliminary AAS.
B. Phenomena Identification Tables and Required Code Models
The identification of the phenomena that could potentially occur within the reference accident scenarios is assessed in a two-stage process. Initially, a review of existing analysis results is undertaken to obtain direct information on the more significant phenomena occurring in normal operation and the selected reference accident sequences. Second, a review of phenomena based on the physical processes imposed by the accident, system design, operating conditions, safety functions, and materials of construction is performed to provide a more comprehensive basis for the assessment. This approach resembles that adopted for the PIRT procedure.
For the HCLL TBS, the phenomena were grouped under ten subheadings: power source, flow, heat transfer, phase change, lead-lithium (PbLi) behavior, chemical reactions, noncondensable gases, material properties, numerical coupling, and system instrumentation and control modeling. The results from each of the reviews were compared and consolidated to produce a single set of phenomena that could potentially influence the progression of the accident sequences. An excerpt from this list showing phenomena related to power source and PbLi modeling is presented in Table I .
C. Code Assessment and Selection
A code assessment and selection procedure is performed to assess the ability of simulation codes to model the phenomena listed in the phenomena identification tables (described in Section III-B). Further considerations, such as code verification status, may be set according to the objective of this paper and its scope.
For the HCLL TBS, additional code assessment criteria included the ability of the codes to resolve local and 2-D/3-D effects and consistency with (existing) ITER safety analyses. Furthermore, the code selection process has been limited to the assessment of different versions of the RELAP5 and MELCOR codes, as prescribed by Fusion for Energy (F4E). The specific code versions that have been considered are as follows:
1) RELAP5/MOD3.3 [88] and RELAP5-3D [89] ; [74] , and 1.8.6 [78] code versions produced by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL); 3) the "standard" MELCOR 1.8.6 [90] and MELCOR 2.1 [91] codes, produced by the Sandia National Laboratory.
The individual versions of the MELCOR and RELAP5 codes have, in many respects, similar capabilities and attributes. Therefore, an overall assessment of the MELCOR and RELAP5 codes was performed whilst highlighting the particular strengths of the individual code versions to represent specific phenomena. As part of this process, specific phenomena identified within the PIRT are discussed in terms of their significance to fault progression and ultimately to the release of radioactivity to the environment. In Table II , the list of phenomena presented in Table I is repeated with statements indicating the ability of the codes to model specific phenomena; a more extensive evaluation was undertaken for key models and correlations. Thus, the relevant similarities and differences between the codes (and where appropriate between code versions) were identified. Another consideration significant for the HCLL TBS safety assessment is consistency with previous ITER analyses with which comparison will be made to determine the impact of the presence of the TBS on the fault analysis results.
In terms of modeling capability, the main contenders are fusion-adapted MELCOR 1.8.5 and fusion-adapted MELCOR 1.8.6. Although the standard versions of MELCOR 1.8.6 and MELCOR 2.1 have advantages over MELCOR 1.8.5 (many improvements to the modeling of fission reactor cores, inclusion of flashing of superheated sources, treatment of MAEROS aerosol coefficients, film modeling in close proximity to the pool, more flexible application of thermal conductivity data, and adjustments to the melt point for interacting materials), these are judged to have only limited impact on the modeling of the phenomena within the HCLL TBS. Fusion-adapted MELCOR 1.8.5 has In terms of verification, the "pedigreed" fusion-adapted MELCOR version 1.8.2 used for ITER safety studies has the advantage that a line-by-line review of the fusion-related updates has been performed. Although not as extensive as for version 1.8.2, fusion-adapted MELCOR 1.8.5 [74] and fusion-adapted MELCOR 1.8.6 [78] have been subject to verification via comparison studies with standard (fission) MELCOR 1.8.5 and pedigreed MELCOR 1.8.2. Fusionadapted MELCOR 1.8.5 has been used in other safety assessments involving PbLi [43] , [69] .
Applied to the HCLL TBS, coverage of physical phenomena becomes the most critical aspect of the code selection decision; amongst the code versions considered, only fusion-adapted MELCOR 1.8.5 includes PbLi as a working fluid, and for that reason, this code version was selected for modeling the HCLL TBS.
For the representation of the ITER machine within the HCLL TBS safety studies, it is assumed that the "pedigreed" fusion-adapted MELCOR version 1.8.2 code will be retained.
This code was used for ITER safety studies, and a change in code version for this part of the model may introduce differences, which would compromise the assessment of the impact of the HCLL TBS design on the release of activity to the environment.
Of the two RELAP5 code versions, RELAP5-3D has the distinct advantage of being able to mechanistically represent the physical response of liquid PbLi to accident conditions. This allows the use of the same modeling strategy for the HCLL TBS using RELAP5-3D and the fusion-adapted version of MELCOR 1.8.5. RELAP5-3D also has additional advantages in terms of heat transfer options that are relevant to the modeling of the HCLL TBS. Therefore, the RELAP5-3D code is selected to support the fusion-adapted version of MELCOR 1.8.5 in the safety assessments for the HCLL TBS.
D. Confirmation of the Accident Analysis Specification
Based on the work performed in the previous steps, the potential accident progression is updated. The process and safety systems assumptions are recorded and included in the AAS. The analysis methodology (scope of modeling) and the specification of the required results are refined. Furthermore, the accident sequence is elaborated on and a flowchart illustrating the accident sequence is drafted. Thus, the new updated AAS together with the developed PIRT and code assessment tables provides the input to the TBS model development for the selected computer codes.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BREEDING BLANKET
AND ANCILLARY SYSTEMS MODELS In the next step of the methodology, accident analysis models are constructed using the selected codes. For the HCLL TBS, F4E requested flexible generic models able to handle a wide spectrum of accidents with minor adaptations, whilst maintaining consistency with ITER analysis models. MELCOR and RELAP5 models have been created that cover all TBS systems and controls, and their relevant ITER environment.
A. Development of the MELCOR Model
The MELCOR model represents the subsystems and main components of the TBS, including the following: 1) HCLL TBM box; 2) HCLL TBM breeder units; 3) HCLL lithium lead (PbLi) ancillary system; 4) HCLL helium coolant system (HCS); 5) HCLL coolant purification system (CPS); 6) port plug (PP); 7) plant safety system (PSS) signals and set points; 8) port cell (PC) 16; 9) the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) area and the shaft linking to PC16; 10) tritium recovery system. We will limit our description in the following to the TBM, PbLi ancillary system, and HCS. We note that during development of the TBS models, the following MELCOR code-specific issues were addressed. 1) Correction of helium gas properties within the fusion-adapted MELCOR 1.8.5 code. 2) Changes to MELCOR sensitivity coefficients were required to properly treat transition to turbulence in the HCS and TBM coolant channels.
1) TBM Box and Breeder Unit (BU) Nodalization:
The HCLL TBM consists of 16 breeding units (BUs), arranged in two side-by-side stacks of eight. The BUs are separated by vertical stiffening grid (VSG) and horizontal stiffening grid with embedded helium coolant channels. Additional helium cooling is provided by two cooling plates within each BU. The FW structures are cooled by 12 helium channels, each of which makes two passes along the top, front (FW), and bottom of the TBM. A more detailed description of the HCLL design is given in [92] .
The design intent of the MELCOR model of the HCLL TBM (and the TBS in general) is to provide the necessary level of model detail whilst achieving a practical transient calculation time. Past experience has shown that MELCOR calculations are significantly limited by the Courant time-step limit which has a direct dependence on the nodalization. This influenced the control volume hydraulic (CVH) nodalization adopted for the HCLL TBM FW and other major flow paths.
For example, the HCLL TBM design incorporates 12 FW coolant channels, each of which passes twice over the height of the FW. Direct modeling of this design would add significant complexity to the MELCOR model. Instead, one flow path is used to represent the upward-flowing sections of the FW coolant passages, as shown in Fig. 1 . A second similar flow path models the downward helium flow in the remaining sections of the FW coolant passages. This arrangement captures the equal cooling of the upper and lower halves of the TBM provided by the true FW design whilst also significantly increasing the volume of the CVH nodes representing the FW coolant channels, thereby increasing the permitted simulation time step, which is fixed by the Courant limit. In addition, it has the following.
1) The MELCOR code allows frictional parameters within the FW flow paths to be set to represent the full length of the "two-pass" FW channels. 2) Heat exchange between the two helium flows, due to the conduction through the narrow metal dividing ribs that separate adjacent FW channels, is modeled.
3) The size and complexity of the model is reduced significantly (compared with a direct MELCOR representation of the two-traverse FW geometry).
The level of detail in the FW model is judged sufficient to capture the FW maximum temperature response, as confirmed by a nodalization sensitivity study. A further significant feature to be captured by the HCLL TBM MELCOR model is the draining of the PbLi during accidents and the consequent repositioning of the power source from the decay heat. This has been achieved by nodalizing all eight BUs (numbered BU1-BU8 from bottom to top) over the entire elevation of the TBM. The model calculates a uniform PbLi temperature across each BU.
The explicit representation of the BUs and associated cooling channels over the full height of the TBM makes the HCLL TBM model large and complex. To limit the size of the model, the two columns of BU within the TBM design are not resolved separately. Instead, the general symmetry of the TBM about the VSG is exploited; a single column of BU is modeled with adjustments to the CVH, flow links, and heat structure (HS) input made such that at each elevation the power, coolant flow, heat transfer, and inventory of both columns are represented.
The nodalization of the PbLi regions within the HCLL TBM is shown in Fig. 2 . The TBM PbLi volumes fall into one of three general categories: inlet/outlet pipes and manifolds represented by six CVH volumes; distribution and collection regions nodalized using eight CVH volumes; and a single CVH volume used for each BU.
2) TBS PbLi Ancillary System: The MELCOR model of the PbLi ancillary system has been constructed to meet the requirements of a deterministic safety assessment. In particular, the model is designed to predict the pressure (both the gravitational pressure head and that generated by the presence of inert cover gas in the system) that will drive leak flows and to represent the draining of the PbLi inventory of the TBM and ancillary system into the PbLi storage tank.
The MELCOR nodalization of the PbLi ancillary system is shown in Fig. 3 . The model represents the pipework of the main flow paths, the cold trap, and storage tank, together with the associated cover gas supplies, circulation pump, valves, bursting disc, and pressure relief valves that protect the TBM and PbLi system from over pressure. The system control logic and PSS signals are also modeled. 
3) TBS Helium Coolant System and Coolant Purification
System: The focus of the HCS model development was on the modeling of normal operation during pulsed plasma operation and off-normal conditions that occur during accident events. The MELCOR nodalization of the HCS is shown in Fig. 4 . The nodalization reproduces all the required aspects of the HCS as follows.
1) Explicit models of the gas cooler, economizer, and heater components within the HCS. 2) A single pump flow path represents the two HCS helium circulators. 3) Explicit models of the pressure control system (PCS).
4) Flow paths model the double isolation valves (IVs) in
the HCS pipework to/from the TBM. 5) Representation of all main HCS pipework.
B. Development of the RELAP5 Model
The RELAP5 modeling work has been conducted using version 4.0.3 of the RELAP5-3D code produced by INL [93] . The modeling approach adopted has been to first develop the MELCOR models of the HCLL TBS, and then apply the same modeling methodology to develop the corresponding RELAP5 model. Nonetheless, differences between the RELAP5 and MELCOR codes have necessitated some changes to the modeling. Areas in which there was not a direct translation in the modeling between MELCOR and RELAP5 are as follows.
1) Resolving detailed flow path models and flow path elevations. 2) Modeling MHD effects.
3) Use of user-defined control functions ("FUN1") that are specific to fusion-adapted MELCOR to describe HS-to-HS heat conduction. 4) Pump modeling. However, the RELAP5-3D code provides sufficient flexibility that these code differences could be largely overcome through changes to the nodalization and the use of control function logic.
In general, no significant differences are expected between the MELCOR and the RELAP5 model performance. Code-tocode comparison of MELCOR and RELAP5 results during the qualification of the TBS models demonstrated that no significant differences in the thermal-hydraulic capabilities were observed. It is noted, however, that RELAP5 does not implement the radionuclide transport models that will be used to assess releases within the MELCOR analyses.
V. REPRESENTATION OF THE ITER ENVIRONMENT WITHIN TBS ACCIDENT ANALYSES
Two approaches are proposed for the representation of the ITER environment of the TBS. The first consists of incorporation of a limited representation of the ITER building and systems within the TBS model. This is applicable only in cases when the TBS has a very weak impact on the ITER machine. The second and preferable option is coupling of the HCLL TBS model with a full accident analysis model of the ITER machine/environment in order to simulate the interaction of both systems. These two approaches are discussed in the following.
A. Model of the ITER Environment Within the TBS Model
The analysis of the TBS accident sequences require the assessment of fluid leakages, possible chemical reactions, and the transport of radionuclides within the VV, PC, CVCS area, tokamak cooling water system vault, and connecting shafts. Therefore, these areas are included but coarsely nodalized (e.g., with a single volume) in the TBS model. Models of ventilation flows, leakage flows, and engineered pressure relief paths are provided between the nodes representing the buildings and environment, as well as HSs modeling the tokamak building to represent the heat absorbed from gases and steam released during accidents.
B. Coupling of the HCLL TBS and ITER Machine MELCOR Models
In order to assess the impact of accidents originating in the TBS on the accident response of the ITER machine, the interaction of these systems must be captured. Examples of this include in-vessel leakage of helium or PbLi that may cause a plasma disruption and ex-vessel leakage of helium that may lead to the pressurization of the PC or triggering of the ITER central safety system (CSS).
In addition, the response of the ITER machine may influence the progression of an accident within the TBS through a range of mechanisms, including the following.
1) The pressure within the VV affects the leak rate of PbLi from the TBM. 2) The composition of the VV atmosphere influences PbLi-air reactions and hydrogen producing PbLi-steam reactions within the TBM. 3) Variation of the PP coolant temperature and flow-the PP acts as a heat sink to the TBM if HCS flow is lost. In general, these interactions between the TBS and the ITER machine are sufficiently strong that a coupled analysis is required, with the accident response of both systems represented.
Direct integration of the TBS MELCOR model and a full ITER machine MELCOR model into a single overall combined model is not possible since MELCOR cannot represent both liquid PbLi and liquid water (used as the primary coolant in the ITER machine) within a single simulation.
Therefore, a loose coupling of two models is used to represent the transient interactions of the ITER machine and the TBS. The selected method for coupling the ITER and TBS models is to perform a sequence of analyses, with a coordinated exchange of data between the two models.
1) Boundary data describing the conditions within the ITER VV/buildings (computed by the ITER machine model) will be imposed on the TBS model. 2) Boundary data describing leakage flows from the TBS (computed by the TBS model) will be imposed on the ITER machine model. 3) Consistent TBS PSS and ITER CSS actions will be imposed on both models. Iteration between the two models will ensure that selfconsistent results are obtained. The MELCOR external data file package provides facilities to transfer leak flow rates, enthalpies, and other data between models to support this form of coupled analysis.
VI. QUALIFICATION OF THE BREEDING BLANKET
AND ANCILLARY SYSTEMS MODELS The TBS accident analysis methodology includes qualification activities to assess the ability of the developed TBS models to represent the phenomena and transient responses associated with the accident sequences defined in the AAS. For the HCLL TBS, the models have been evaluated via a test matrix (Table III) 
A. Comparison With Finite-Element Design Analyses
Comparison of MELCOR and RELAP5 simulations of a 400 s plasma power pulse (case 2 in Table III) with FEA results (labeled as DDD in the figures) are shown in Fig. 5 . The RELAP5 FW coolant temperature peaks at 379°C at 430 s, just 1°C above the MELCOR value and ∼3°C below the FEA results, both of which peak at ∼430 s.
The maximum FW structure temperatures are shown in Fig. 6 . The RELAP5, MELCOR, and FEA design analysis results show the same pulse shape. The RELAP5 maximum FW temperature peaks at 518°C at 430 s, compared with 524°C at 430 s in MELCOR and 529°C at 430 s in the FEA results.
The apparent underestimation of the FW temperature by the RELAP5 model (11°C lower than the MELCOR result, 5°C below the FEA value) occurs because the surface heat flux on the RELAP5 FW is "smeared" over the thickness of the plasma-facing FW HSs. Hand calculations show that the impact of smearing the FW surface heat flux in RELAP5 is 9.7°C, leading to an estimated corrected RELAP5 FW 
B. Code-to-Code Comparison
The accident in Test Sequence 2-In-vessel loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (case 7 in Table III ) represents a double ended guillotine break of the FW helium flow channels within a horizontal plane at the midelevation of the TBM. The helium LOCA occurs close to the end of the plasma pulse and results in a disruption, terminating the plasma. The PbLi BUs remain intact for the duration of the accident. The coolant pressure response in the TBM agrees well between both models (Fig. 7) , as do the break flow rates (see Fig. 8 ). Good agreement was also demonstrated between the codes' results in the impact of the closure of the IVs on the discharge rate. The total coolant discharge to the VV is 21.8 and 20.9 kg for MELCOR and RELAP5, respectively, which correspond to 54% and 52% of the total HCS helium inventory of 40 kg.
C. Sensitivity Studies
The uncertainty in leakage flow of liquid PbLi following a breach within a BU has been addressed via a sensitivity study. The main parameter investigated is the location of the BU in which the breach occurs. Multiple breaches and breach geometries have also been considered; however, the total breach area remains constant throughout the analyses. The sensitivity study determines the magnitude of the PbLi leak rate into the VV, together with any variation in the leaked PbLi inventory. The analyses cover the accident scenarios presented in the case 11 of Table IV. As shown in Fig. 9 , there is very little difference between the four cases in the total amount of PbLi discharged into the VV (∼2200 kg). The slightly lower total discharge in the case 2BU-1&8 (2178 kg, a reduction of 1%) is a result of earlier IV closure in this simulation, which restricts inflow from the PbLi ancillary system. Table IV shows the impact of the breach locations on the leakage rate of PbLi into the VV. The peak flow rates vary from 14.2 kg s −1 (for case 2BU-1&8) to 16.78 kg s −1 (for case 2BU-1&3), a difference of ∼18%. In each case, the peak PbLi leak flow occurs <1 s after the start of the leak. The comparison of the residual PbLi mass within the TBM indicates no difference between the four sensitivity cases; this mass is determined largely by the elevation of the lower leak path, which is unchanged between the four cases analyzed earlier. Similarly, there is little variation in the resultant pressure in the VV calculated for each case. 
D. Uncertainty Analysis
The impact of uncertainties associated with the accident analyses needs to be addressed to provide sufficient confidence in the level of conservatism in the results. An expert review of areas of uncertainty (including an uncertainty PIRT) is planned and will be reported on in a subsequent dedicated paper.
VII. APPLICATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY AND FUTURE EU TBS SAFETY ACTIVITIES
Finally, the qualified models are applied to analyze the selected accident scenarios defined in the TBS PrSR. The process consists of the following activities.
1) Adaptation of the TBS generic MELCOR/ RELAP5 model for the analysis of the specific accident. 2) Execution of the accident analysis using the selected code or codes (application of more than one code model provides for an additional qualification of the models). 3) Analysis of the results. 4) Comparison with previous results, analogous accidents in ITER, other TBSs, or similar HCLL TBS accidents. 5) Modifications/corrections of the TBS generic models if deemed necessary in above two points. The methodology has been applied to a 32 h LOOP in both the HCLL and helium-cooled pebble-bed (HCPB) TBSs, using both MELCOR and RELAP in order to further qualify the models via code comparison. The analyses of the loss of flow accidents in each TBS using MELCOR are on-going.
These are TBS accidents with very limited impact on the ITER machine. In the next analyses, model coupling will be used to investigate TBS accidents that might affect the ITER machine and require the simulation of interacting phenomena and processes that take place in several systems.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A comprehensive methodology for fusion breeding blanket accident analysis that addresses the specificity of the designs, materials, and phenomena while remaining consistent with the approach already applied to ITER has been developed and applied to the EU HCLL and HCPB TBSs. The strong points of the methodology are the use of PIRT to identify requirements to be met by the analysis codes and models; development of high quality TBS models; the loose coupling of different codes or code versions in order to simulate multifluid flows and phenomena overcoming the codes' limitations; qualification of the models by comparison with FEA and code-to-code comparisons; and uncertainty analysis utilizing sensitivity studies. We believe that the developed methodology is applicable to accident analyses of other TBSs to be tested in ITER and as well to DEMO breeding blankets. Further work is planned on the coupling of the BBs and tokamak machine models that require the simulation of interacting phenomena and processes that take place in several systems.
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